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UNTANGLING RICCI V. DESTEFANO: THE
WARDS COVE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
D’Ontae D. Sylvertooth*

I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was drafted with the intention of eradicating employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin.1 The Supreme Court, through a series of cases,
has, over the years, expanded and then weakened the remedial effect of
Title VII. For example, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. the Court held that
Title VII not only prohibited intentional discrimination, but also prohibited neutral policies and procedures that had a disparate impact on an
identifiable group of individuals.2 However, in 1989, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio the Court diminished the force of Griggs by imposing
new burdens on plaintiffs in disparate impact cases and requiring that
employees identify the specific employer practice or decision responsible
for the disparate impact,3 a ruling that required congressional intervention to overturn its more onerous burdens on plaintiffs.4
As in Wards Cove, the Supreme Court’s decision in Ricci v. DeStefano is again testing the nation’s commitment to civil rights by diminishing
the force of Title VII’s disparate impact jurisprudence.5 This note explores the way in which Ricci severely limits the ability of employers to

*
D’Ontae is a third-year law student at the University of New Mexico and
would like to thank his son, Davion Claudio-Sylvertooth, for keeping his daddy
grounded. The author would also like to thank his professors, Margaret Montoya, for
her unyielding support and desire to see students challenge the status quo, and
Michael Browde for his dedication to the law review and its members. Additionally,
the author would like to dedicate this article to his mentor, Veronica A. Cunningham
(Oct. 5, 1960–June 26, 2010), who passed away too suddenly—you will be forever
missed and your guidance remains with me.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. See infra note 17
and accompanying text.
2. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See infra notes 24–31 and accompanying text.
3. 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. See infra notes 37–48 and accompanying text.
4. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071.
5. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
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eliminate their own employment practices that have a disparate impact
on minorities seeking public employment.
Part II follows, and explains the background of the development
and shrinkage of the disparate impact jurisprudence leading to the decision in Ricci. Part III explains Ricci and its attempted resolution of the
tension between the dual requirements found in the 1991 amendments to
Title VII, which were aimed at preventing unlawful disparate impact
without engaging in prohibited race-based decisions in employment.6 Part
IV concludes the note with an exploration of the new Ricci standard
which is applicable when reverse discrimination claims are brought
against employers, urging adherence to test results. Under the Ricci standard, such test results must stand unless there is a “strong basis in evidence” to reject those results. Further, Part IV explores how the circuit
courts might apply that standard in the disparate impact context, when its
application has differed in the constitutional context from whence it
came.
II. BACKGROUND
To fully appreciate the impact of Ricci it is important to understand
the historical development of Title VII and its rather circuitous route to
its current state as the fundamental federal tool to combat discrimination
in employment, including public employment.
A. The Path to the Civil Rights Act of 1964
As early as the 1940s, Congress attempted to formulate legislation
that prohibited employment discrimination.7 However, it was not until
twenty-four years later that such effort came to fruition with the passage
of Title VII.
During that period there were a number of failed attempts at passing national employment antidiscrimination laws, which were aimed primarily at public employment and known as fair employment practices
(FEP) legislation.8 The first attempt at such legislation was a 1941 bill
introduced by Congressman Vito Marcantonio, and was entitled “A Bill
to Prohibit Discrimination by Any Agency Supported in Whole or in Part

6. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071.
7. See Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L.
REV. 431, 431 (1966).
8. Id. FEP legislation was legislation that attempted to equalize the workforce
by implementing federal legislation with the purpose of assisting minority citizens. Id.
Simply put, FEP legislation can be seen as a predecessor to the Civil Rights Act of
1964.
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with Funds Appropriated by the Congress of the United States of
America, and to Prohibit Discrimination Against Persons Employed or
Seeking Employment on Government Contracts Because of Race, Color,
or Creed.”9 The next year, Congressman Marcantonio introduced a second FEP bill entitled “A Bill to Prohibit Discrimination in Employment
Because of Race, Color, Creed, Religion, National Origin, or Citizenship.”10 Apparently both bills, like hundreds of subsequent FEP bills, died
in committee or were defeated during debate as a result of Senate filibusters.11 The 1963 House Committee on the Judiciary considered 172 bills
addressing FEP, only six of which contained comprehensive antidiscrimination provisions aimed at private employment.12
In light of the failure of past efforts, President F. Kennedy emphasized the dire need for national antidiscrimination legislation when he
introduced his civil rights package to Congress in 1963 by stating:
The legal remedies I have proposed are the embodiment of this
nation’s basic posture of common sense and common justice. They
involve every American’s right to vote, to go to school to get a job
and to be served in a public place without arbitrary discrimination—rights which most Americans take for granted.13

Kennedy’s civil rights package had eight titles. Title VII, denominated as
the Equal Employment Opportunity title, authorized the President to establish a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity with the sole
responsibility of dealing with firms that had governmental contracts.14 In
order for Kennedy’s civil rights package to pass, tactical political precision was required, such as gaining support from Everett Dirksen, a Republican Illinois Senator, a political player who would find ways to
appease the political divide surrounding Title VII.15 President Kennedy
did not live to see the passage of the Civil Rights Act, but President Lyndon B. Johnson was instrumental in forcing the bill through Congress,
and signed the Act into law on July 2, 1964, declaring:
And the law I will sign tonight forbids [discrimination]. Its purpose is not to punish . . . but to end divisions—divisions which
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

87 CONG. REC. 2259 (1941) (introducing H.R. 3994).
88 CONG. REC. 6423 (1942) (introducing H.R. 7412).
Vaas, supra note 7, at 431.
Id. at 434.
CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 1 (1985) (quoting President’s address to
Congress).
14. Civil Rights Act of 1963, H.R. Rep. No. 88-914, § 711(b) at 14 (1963).
15. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 13, at 150–96.
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have lasted too long. Its purpose is national, not regional. Its purpose is to promote a more abiding commitment to freedom, a
more constant pursuit of justice, and a deeper respect for human
dignity.16

This led Congress to introduce what has arguably become the largest antidiscrimination legislation in its history. The legislation sought to place
all individuals on an equal playing field irrespective of their immutable
characteristics.
B. Action Prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
The newly enacted Title VII provided protection from discriminatory actions by employers, and it covered the actions of employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations as well.17 Section 703 of the
Act made it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to make
an employment decision, such as hiring, discharging, or one that would
affect an employee’s status, based on the individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.18 Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have
both extended and limited the meaning of these protections, the burdens
of proof associated with them, and the overall effect of Title VII.
C. Major Supreme Court Decisions Impacting the Effect of Title VII
One of the first cases to expand the effect of Title VII was Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., which recognized that a violation of the Act may result
from neutral employment practices that impact classes of individuals that

16. Id. at 232. (quoting Radio and Television Remarks upon Signing the Civil
Rights Bill, 2 PUB. PAPERS 824–44 (July 2, 1964).
17. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)). Section 701 of the 1964 version of Title
VII defined an employer as “an industry affecting commerce who has twenty-five or
more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in
the current or preceding calendar year.” Id. § 701(b). The current version requires
that the employer have fifteen employees, which was codified in the 1972 amendment
of Title VII. Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103, 103.
Additionally, it no longer contains the language in the original definition of employment agency that excluded “an agency of the United States, or an agency of a State or
political subdivision of a State, except that such term shall include the United States
Employment Service and the system of State and local employment services receiving
Federal assistance.” Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(c). Compare with 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(c) (2006). Given that the Ricci case deals particularly with an employer’s decision, this note will only focus on aspects of Title VII that cover the actions of
employers.
18. Civil Rights Act § 703(a)(1–2). The 1991 amendment did not change this
language. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1–2) (2006).
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the Act protects, which has since been termed “disparate impact.”19 In
Griggs, thirteen African American employees claimed that a new company policy, requiring employees to have a high school diploma and to
pass two standardized general intelligence tests before being transferred
to another department, was a violation of Title VII.20 Griggs turned on
whether the new prerequisites implemented by Duke Power contravened
the discrimination prohibited by Title VII.21 In its analysis of the issue, the
Court was concerned that neither requirement was significantly related to
job performance; that the requirements operated to disqualify a covered
group of individuals; and that white employees traditionally filled the jobs
in question.22
In ruling for the minority plaintiffs, the Court began by noting that
the plain language of Title VII identified the congressional intent “to
achieve equality of employment opportunities and to remove barriers
that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white
employees over other employees.”23 The Court went on to hold that
“practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in
terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”24 The Court thus concluded that given the congressional purpose, the statute must give rise to
a disparate impact claim even when unintentional discrimination results
from neutral policies and procedures disproportionately affecting an
identifiable group of individuals.25 According to the Court, the requirements implemented by Duke Power were nothing more than proxies,
which in turn was discrimination, given the years of inferior education
endured by African Americans—attributable to the perception that African Americans, as a race, were inferior to whites.26

19. 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971) (rejecting an employment test that was neutral
on its face that sought to “ ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices”).
20. Id. at 426–28. Until 1966, Duke Power Company employed African Americans only in its labor department. Id. at 427. Positions in the labor department were
the lowest paying positions in the company. See id. Not until 1966, five months after
an employee filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, was an African American transferred into one of the company’s
higher paying operation departments. Id. at 427 n.2.
21. Id. at 425–26.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 429–30.
24. Id. at 430 (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 431–33.
26. See id. at 430.
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The Griggs Court acknowledged that tests could—and frequently
did—disproportionately remove employment opportunities from minorities, and it also demonstrated the attendant difficulties individuals may
have in obtaining direct evidence that a practice is created to discriminate
against them.27 The Court did not prohibit employers from using tests, but
required that such tests meet a “business necessity” standard—i.e., that
the test was sufficiently related to job performance.28
The Court acknowledged that Duke Power’s good intentions could
be gleaned from its efforts to financially assist undereducated employees
in obtaining high school training.29 However, the Court recognized that
good intentions or absence of discriminatory intent are not enough. This
was because “Congress directed the thrust of [Title VII] to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation,”30 and because good intentions could not “redeem employment procedures or
testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority
groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.”31
In 1975, the Supreme Court returned to the subject of employee
testing in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, addressing what an employer
must show to establish that pre-employment tests are sufficiently job related to avoid a disparate impact challenge.32 Albermarle involved a class
action suit brought by current and former African American employees
requesting permanent injunctive relief against “any policy, practice, custom or usage at the plant that violated Title VII.”33
As in Griggs, the employer in Albemarle required applicants for employment in the skilled positions, known as the lines of progression, to
have a high school diploma and to pass two tests.34 In addressing the legitimacy of the tests, the Court expanded on the Griggs business necessity

27. See id. at 432 (The Court built the case for discrimination only on indirect
evidence of educational disadvantage.).
28. Id. at 431.
29. Id. at 432.
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. Id.
32. 422 U.S. 405, 408 (1975).
33. Id. at 409 (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Id. at 409–10. The district court determined that the plant had “strictly segregated” the plant’s departmental “lines of progression” prior to January 1, 1964. Id. at
409. Such segregated lines of progression reserved the higher paying and more skilled
lines for white employees. Id. These segregated processes continued until 1968 when
the lines were reorganized under a new collective bargaining agreement. Id. The reorganization left African American employees “locked in the lower paying job classifications,” where such positions were placed at the bottom of the white lines. Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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requirement, ruling that “discriminatory tests are impermissible unless
shown, by professionally acceptable methods, to be predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which
comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being
evaluated.”35 Accordingly, although the Griggs/Albemarle standard does
not make testing impermissible, it does require a compelling relationship
between the test given and the actual job sought.
The disparate impact approach does not extend to constitutional
claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, because both purpose
and effect remain necessary to state a constitutional claim of discrimination.36 The Court in Washington v. Davis, which established that principle,
also refused to hold that the standard for constitutional claims of “invidious racial discrimination [was] identical to the standards applicable under
Title VII.”37
Thirteen years later the Supreme Court, in Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio38 weakened the disparate impact approach from Griggs by placing a heavier burden on plaintiffs to prove disparate impact cases. Wards
Cove addressed disparate impact claims brought by non-white cannery
workers who alleged that the company’s employment practices kept them
and other non-white employees from being employed as non-cannery
workers.39 Prior to Wards Cove, simply showing a significant statistical
difference in the racial composition of the employer’s workforce could
prove a prima facie case of disparate impact.40 Wards Cove, however, diverged from this standard when it declared that “the proper comparison
is between the racial composition of the at-issue jobs and the racial com-

35. Id. at 431 (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). Because the case was
brought against the District of Columbia Police Department, and Wash. D.C. is not a
state, the parties could not bring such suit under the Fourteenth Amendment. Their
claim, instead, arose under equal protection, which the court in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954), read into the federal Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Davis, 426 U.S. at 239.
37. 426 U.S. at 239.
38. 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 171.
39. Id. at 647–48. Cannery positions were considered unskilled work, and were
predominately filled by non-whites, mostly Filipinos and Alaska Natives. Id. at 647.
The non-cannery positions were considered skilled work—mostly consisting of machinists and engineers—and were predominately filled by whites. Id. at 647 n.3. The
salary for non-cannery positions was substantially higher than for cannery positions.
Id. at 647.
40. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 438 n.6 (1971) (using statistics to show that there was an impact).
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position of the qualified population in the relevant labor market.”41 According to the Court, a more rigorous standard for establishing a
disparate impact violation was needed to dissuade employers from implementing quota systems designed to avoid lawsuits based upon racial
imbalances.42
Wards Cove stood for the proposition that a racial imbalance in the
defendant’s entire workforce, absent something more, did not establish a
prima facie case of disparate impact. It further introduced the concept of
causation into the disparate impact calculus. Under the new standard, the
plaintiff was required to isolate and identify the “specific employment
practice[s] that [were] allegedly responsible for any observed statistical
disparities,” and, once the plaintiff showed the disparate impact in the
particular unit, he must then be able to demonstrate that the employer
utilized the challenged device to create the disparate impact.43 As if anticipating an outcry from the civil rights community, the Court opined that
this requirement was not unduly burdensome because the civil discovery
rules would allow the plaintiff to obtain the necessary records from the
employer to establish the claim.44
Wards Cove also placed the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff to
establish the absence of a business necessity, thus reversing the burden on
the employer that applied in Griggs and Albemarle. Under Wards Cove,
the employer is required only to state the business justification for its
practices.45 There is no requirement that the challenged practice be “essential or indispensable” to the business.46 After the employer meets his
burden of coming forward, Wards Cove leaves it to the plaintiff to prove
there was a less discriminatory alternative practice available that would
achieve the same business end.47 However, such alternatives had to be
equally effective in achieving the employer’s legitimate employment
goals.48 The Court utilized the new burden-shifting49 scheme to determine

41. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States,
433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977)) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and ellipsis omitted).
42. See id. at 652.
43. Id. at 656–57 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994
(1988)).
44. Id. at 657.
45. Id. at 659.
46. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. Id. at 660–61.
48. Id. at 661.
49. While some may argue that the burden of proof has always remained with
the plaintiff, the Court’s discussion in Wards Cove provides a different perspective.
The Court stated:
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if the “challenged practice serve[d], in a significant way, the legitimate
employment goals of the employer.”50
Wards Cove overruled the core of Griggs/Albemarle with respect to
both the showing required for a disparate impact claim, and “business
necessity.” In both instances the burden on plaintiffs was significantly increased, making it much more difficult to establish such a claim. It would
take congressional action to overrule Wards Cove, which severely impaired plaintiff’s ability to succeed under a disparate impact suit under
Title VII.
D. Title VII as Amended in 1991
Just two years later, Wards Cove was substantially overturned by the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.51 In that statute Congress declared that “the decision of the Supreme Court in [Wards Cove] has
weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections.”52 Congress expressly rejected the business justification scheme articulated in Wards Cove. Instead, it codified the concept of “business
necessity” and “job related” as identified and explained in Griggs and
Albemarle.53 Additionally, the burden of proof scheme articulated in
Wards Cove was nullified. Under the amendment, once a plaintiff shows
that an employer utilized a practice that disproportionately impacted one
group (or that an employer failed to utilize a less intrusive alternative),
the burden shifts to the employer to either show that the practice did not
cause a disparate impact or that such practice was required for business
necessity.54
The 1991 amendments, however, left the causation requirement of
Wards Cove largely intact, but under the amendment, a plaintiff can identify the decisionmaking process as a whole as defective, rather than hav-

This rule conforms with the usual method for allocating persuasion and production burdens in the federal courts, and more specifically, it conforms to the
rule in disparate-treatment cases that the plaintiff bears the burden of disproving an employer’s assertion that the adverse employment action or practice was based solely on a legitimate neutral consideration. We acknowledge
that some of our earlier decisions can be read as suggesting otherwise. But to
the extent that those cases speak of an employers’ “burden of proof” with
respect to a legitimate business justification defense, they should have been
understood to mean an employer’s production—but not persuasion—burden.

Id. at 659–60 (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 659.
51. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
52. Id. § 2(2).
53. See id. § 3(2) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. See id. § 105.
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ing to identify each specific incident as required under Wards Cove.55 The
amendment also codifies the Wards Cove requirement that the plaintiff
must identify the specific employment practice challenged and then show
the causal link between that practice and the disparate impact.56
E. The Testing Dilemma
In 1978, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the Department of Labor (DOL),
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) jointly adopted the Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures (later renamed the Uniform Guidelines).57 These guidelines sought to “provide a framework for determining
the proper use of tests and other selection procedures.”58 Currently, they
indicate that employers should maintain testing records in a manner that
would allow the records to be inspected if a procedure is suspected of
having an adverse impact on a particular group.59
Employers are encouraged to utilize validation studies to ensure
that they are adhering to the Uniform Guidelines.60 There are generally
three types of validation studies: criterion-related validity studies, content
validity studies, and construct validity studies.
A construct validity study forces an employer to ensure that they
have the proper sample of employees to conduct the study.61 Once the
sample is identified, then the employer would necessarily need to “review
[the] job information to determine measures of work behavior(s) or performance that are in question.”62 The criteria developed for this type of
validity study are “relevant to the extent that they represent critical or

55.

Id. sec. 105, §703(k)(1)(B)(i). The statute currently provides:

With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice causes a
disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining party
shall demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes
a disparate impact, except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to
the court that the elements of a respondent’s decisionmaking process are not
capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice.

Id.
56. Civil Rights Act of 1991, sec. 105, §703(k)(1)(B)(i). See also supra notes
43–44 and accompanying text.
57. 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1978).
58. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedure (1978), § 1607.1(B)
(2010).
59. Id. § 1607.4(A).
60. See id. § 1607.5(A) (permitting users to use one of a variety of validation
studies).
61. Id. § 1607.14(B)(1).
62. Id. § 1607.14(B)(2).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\41-1\NMX105.txt

Spring 2011]

unknown

Seq: 11

UNTANGLING RICCI V. DESTEFANO

16-NOV-11

11:10

305

important job duties, work behaviors, or work outcomes.”63 Unlike in
other validity tests, it is of utmost importance in construct validity studies
that potential biases be identified and rating techniques associated with
these criteria be developed to avoid such bias.64
An integral part of a content validity study is a job analysis that
analyzes the “important work behavior(s) required for successful performance and their relative importance and, if the behavior results in
work product(s), an analysis of the work product(s).”65 A content validity
study is not appropriate, however, when an employer is attempting to
measure intelligence, aptitude, personality, or traits that the employee is
reasonably expected to learn on the job.66
When an employer attempts to validate a test that seeks to measure
those traits, both prongs of a two-prong test must be met. First, the employer must show that the procedure measures and uses a representative
sample of the knowledge, skill, or ability being assessed.67 Second, the
knowledge, skill, or ability being assessed must be a necessary prerequisite to performance of critical or important work in the position(s) in
question.68
Construct validity studies are more complex than content validity
studies, because they require a more sophisticated job analysis that must
identify the work behaviors needed to be successful in the position, the
critical work behaviors of the job, and identification of the constructs believed to be the underlying elements of successful performance.69 Each
construct identified must be related to the job and shown, by empirical
evidence, to be validly related to the performance of critical work behaviors.70 Thus, the Uniform Guidelines provide additional information as to
how such studies should be presented for purposes of validation, but they
have proven to create an “extensive and arduous” process for employers
to follow.71
Furthermore, no matter how carefully an employer seeks to follow
the guidelines in devising an appropriate test, one can never fully evaluate validity until the test is administered. That poses the very dilemma
that confronted the Court in Ricci—how to balance the dual duties

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 1607.14(C)(2).
§ 1607.14(C)(1).
§ 1607.14(C)(4).
§ 1607.14(D)(2).
§ 1607.14(D)(3).
§ 1607.14(D)(1).
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presented in the 1991 Act. For example, how should a governmental entity deal with the results of a test that suggest a violation of the disparate
impact standard, without violating the other statutory requirement: that
the state not “alter the results of [an] employment related test[ ] on the
basis of race.”72
III. STATEMENT AND ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
Ricci v. DeStafano,73 a 2009 Supreme Court decision, sought to answer that question, and resolve contention between the disparate treatment and disparate impact prongs of Title VII—both prongs equally
demanding compliance from employers. In Ricci, the City of New Haven
(City) was sued by seventeen firefighters (sixteen white and one Hispanic) who alleged that the City engaged in discriminatory practices
when it rejected employee advancement tests scores after the results
showed that a significant number of white candidates passed in comparison to minority candidates.74 Specifically, the firefighters argued that the
City rejected the tests scores based on race because there were insufficient minority candidates eligible for promotion.75 This argument was rejected by the district court and the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.76 However, Justice Kennedy, writing for the 5-4 majority, reversed, concluding that the City’s action in setting aside the tests violated
the fundamental principle that “no individual should face workplace discrimination based on race.”77
A. Background Facts
The City of New Haven Fire Department (Department) administered objective promotional employment tests for the positions of lieutenant and captain in November 2003 and December 2004.78 Forty-one
applicants took the captain exam with sixteen white applicants, three African American applicants, and three Hispanic applicants passing.79 Sev72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l) (2006).
73. 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
74. Id. at 2664.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 2671–72.
77. Id. at 2681. The Kennedy opinion was joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts. Justices Scalia and Alito also filed concurring opinions, while Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Breyer.
78. Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 145 (D. Conn. 2006), rev’d, 129 S.
Ct. 2658 (2009).
79. Id.
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enty-seven applicants took the lieutenant exam with twenty-five white
applicants, six African American applicants, and three Hispanic applicants passing.80 The Department only had seven vacant captain positions
available, which meant that when the Department deployed the “rule of
three,” no African Americans and, at most, two Hispanics, would be eligible for a captain promotion.81 Likewise, the lieutenant position only had
eight vacancies.82 Since the top ten scorers on the lieutenant exam were
white, not a single African American or Hispanic applicant would be eligible for a promotion to lieutenant.83
The City’s Civil Service Board (CSB), in an attempt to determine
whether or not to certify the tests’ results, held several meetings between
January and March of 2004.84 At the first CSB hearing, New Haven’s Corporation Counsel, Thomas Ude, testified that the tests’ results showed “a
very significant disparate impact,” and that the City needed to decide
whether or not to certify the tests.85 In raising this issue, Ude advised the
CSB that “case law does not require that the City find that the test[s]
[are] indefensible in order to take action that it believes is appropriate to
remedy . . . disparate impact from examination . . . . A test can be jobrelated and have a disparate impact on an ethnic group . . . .”86
The CSB received anecdotal testimony from firefighters and members of the community—some urging certification due to the appropriate
materials on the tests and others urging noncertification because the tests
seemed unfair. Frank Ricci, a firefighter eligible for promotion, believed
certification was appropriate because the test questions came from nationally recognized books and the City of New Haven’s Rules and Regulations and Standard Operating Procedures.87 Additionally, Ricci testified
that he spent eight to thirteen hours a day preparing for the tests and that
he incurred significant preparation expenses ($1,000).88 Contrarily, one
firefighter expressed his belief that the tests were unfair because the information tested was not used by firefighters.89 Additionally, others ar-

80. Id.
81. Id. at 145. The “rule of three” is a rule from the City’s charter mandating
that a civil service position be filled by one of the three individuals with the highest
scores on the exam. Id. Exam results show that Hispanics ranked seven, eight, and
thirteen; African Americans ranked sixteen, nineteen, and twenty-two. Id. at 145 n.2.
82. Id. at 145.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 145–46.
87. Id. at 146.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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gued that many of the firefighters did not have access to the necessary
books.90 Donald Day, a representative of the International Association of
Black Professional Firefighters, urged noncertification because the Department’s previous employment advancement tests actually had given
African Americans and Hispanics a real chance of promotion.91
Chad Legel, Vice President of I/O Solutions (IOS) (the company
responsible for the creation of the tests in dispute) testified to the CSB
that the tests were “facially neutral.”92 He supported this testimony by
describing the manner in which the tests were developed. In constructing
the tests, IOS interviewed a random sample of current lieutenants and
captains in the Department to ascertain basic information about the positions.93 IOS then constructed a written job analysis questionnaire based
on the interviews and asked current lieutenants and captains to provide
feedback as to how often tasks were performed and how essential such
tasks were to the positions.94 The final written tests were reviewed for
“content and fidelity to the source material” by a Battalion Chief from
the Cobb County, Georgia Fire Department.95 A Fire Chief from outside
Connecticut reviewed the final oral tests.96 This validation process was
utilized to avoid using internal personnel that could potentially facilitate
cheating on the tests.97
Other employment test experts testified before the CSB in order to
assist the City in reaching a determination regarding certification. Dr.
Christopher Hornick, an industrial/organizational psychologist, did not
review the tests in detail, but reviewed the final tests’ results and concluded that there was a “relatively high adverse impact.”98 Dr. Hornick
provided numerous possible explanations for the disparate impact, such
as: (a) whites typically outperform ethnic minorities on standardized
tests, (b) the weighting system used by the Department could cause the
impact, and (c) a lack of internal reviewers results in failure to ensure
that relevant information is tested.99 Dr. Janet Helms, Professor of counseling psychology, also did not examine the tests at issue, but testified
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 147–48.
93. Id. at 147.
94. Id.
95. Id. (quoting Plaintiff’s Exhibit Vol. IV(B) at 24–25) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 148. (quoting Plaintiff’s Exhibit Vol. IV(D) at 11) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
99. Id. at 148–49.
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that race and culture could influence the test results—noting particularly
that 67 percent of those who completed the questionnaires were white.100
Ultimately, a split vote by the CSB resulted in noncertification of the
tests.101
B. Lower Courts’ Decisions
After the tests’ results were rejected, the firefighters filed suit
against the City in the federal district court of Connecticut.102 The
firefighters alleged that the City’s decision, and/or advocacy, against certification was intentional discrimination against the firefighters in favor of
Hispanic and African American employees based on their race.103 The
City countered that the decision not to certify the results was based upon
federal, state, and local antidiscrimination laws.104 Additionally, the
firefighters argued that the City’s “good faith belief” that certifying tests’
results would violate Title VII was pretextual and not a defense to allegations of Title VII violations.105
The district court, ruling in favor of the City, determined that the
2003 tests’ results showed a disparity and did not pass the EEOC’s “fourfifths rule”106 In examining the tests’ results further, the court acknowledged that the pass rate for the lieutenant’s exam for white applicants
was 60.5 percent, for African Americans it was 31.6 percent, and for Hispanics it was 20 percent.107 These percentages showed that there was an
100. Id. at 149.
101. Id. at 150.
102. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009).
103. Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 151. The firefighters also raised arguments that are
not the subject of this case note. The firefighters alleged that the noncertification vote
was due to political pressure, particularly by defendant Reverend Boise Kimber, an
African American minister, who was a political supporter of Mayor DeStefano. Id. at
150. The firefighters alleged that the defendants urged noncertification for the sake of
pleasing minority voters and other constituents in New Haven. Id. The firefighters
argued that any apparent disparity in the results of the tests was due to the fact that
hiring into, and promotion within, the Department, historically had been based on
political patronage and promotion of racial diversity rather than merit. Id. The
firefighters also raised a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim. Id. at 151.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 153. The “four-fifths rule” provides that a selection tool that yields
[a] selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than fourfifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate
will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of
adverse impact, while a greater than four-fifths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact.

29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D).
107. Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 153.
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adverse impact rate, of 59 percent (which was less than the recommended
80 percent).108 Irrespective of the dispute between the parties concerning
the final pass rate of minorities for the captain’s exam, the court concluded that the passage rate for whites was nearly doubled, yielding an
adverse impact rate well below the four-fifths guidelines.109 In examining
the firefighters’ pretextual argument regarding test scores, the court reviewed test scores from a 1999 employee advancement test administered
by the City of New Haven that also showed an impact that had statistical
significance.110 However, the court determined that the previous adverse
impact scores were insufficient to show pretext because African Americans and Hispanics had opportunities for promotion under the 1999
test.111
The court rejected the firefighters’ validation study argument, specifically stating that the EEOC’s Uniform Guidelines validation requirement only applies when an employer is defending a test against a
disparate impact claim—not where an employer is rejecting a discriminatory testing model.112 The firefighters also argued that the City failed to
seek alternative methods or conduct a validity test because it was concerned with diversity, which was in effect reverse discrimination.113 The
court rejected this argument and concluded that there was sufficient evidence to show that there were inherent disparities in both testing models,
and it was unnecessary for the City to explore alternatives.114 To reach
this conclusion, the court used a series of Second Circuit precedents to

108. Id.
109. Id. at 153–54.
110. Id. at 154.
111. Id. In conforming to the “rule of three,” employers must take into consideration an individual’s pass rate and their rank. Id. In the 1999 test, minority employees’
ranks were significantly higher than the 2003 test, allowing minorities to be promoted.
See id.
112. Id. at 154–55. The Uniform Guidelines state:
The use of any selection procedure which has an adverse impact on the hiring,
promotion, or other employment or membership opportunities of members of
any race, sex, or ethnic group will be considered to be discriminatory and
inconsistent with these guidelines, unless the procedure has been validated in
accordance with these guidelines . . . .

29 C.F.R. § 1607.3(A).
113. Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 156–57.
114. See id. at 158. The firefighters argued that the City needed to have alternative promotion methods available or identified prior to noncertification, because
there was not a specific reason articulated that caused the disparities. Id. at 156. The
court reviewed the evidence from both perspectives and determined that testing experts (Dr. Hornick and Dr. Helms) had identified varying causes for the disparities
and that an identification of the specific reason for the disparities was unnecessary. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\41-1\NMX105.txt

Spring 2011]

unknown

Seq: 17

UNTANGLING RICCI V. DESTEFANO

16-NOV-11

11:10

311

conclude that the City’s motivation not to certify the tests’ results with a
racially disparate impact did not constitute discriminatory intent.115
After the district court ruled in favor of the City, the firefighters
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.116 The Second
Circuit initially issued a summary order, affirming the district court’s decision and describing it as a “thorough, thoughtful, and well-reasoned
opinion.”117 The Second Circuit then withdrew the summary order and
issued a per curiam opinion affirming the district court’s decision.118 The
CSB, according to the court, was complying with its obligations under
Title VII when an examination has a “disproportionate racial impact.”119
C. Supreme Court’s Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court, ruling in favor of the firefighters, held that rejection of promotional tests’ scores could only occur when the employer
can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that if it failed to reject the
tests, it will be held liable under the disparate impact provision of Title
VII.120 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, reasoned that remedial
action based solely upon a statistical showing of racial disparities is a violation of Title VII’s disparate treatment provision.121
The Court, in an attempt to strike a balance between the disparate
treatment and disparate impact provisions of Title VII, turned to Equal
Protection jurisprudence and adopted the strong basis in evidence standard.122 By doing so, the Court rejected the firefighters’ argument that an
employer cannot take race-based adverse employment actions to avoid
disparate impact liability even when it knows that there is a violation.123
115. Id. at 157–60. See Hayden v. Cnty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 48–49 (2d Cir.
1999) (“ ‘[R]acial motive’ [is not] a synonym for a constitutional violation.” (quoting
Raso v. Lago, 135 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 1998))); Bushey v. N.Y. State Civil Serv.
Comm’n., 733 F.2d 220, 225–26 (2d Cir. 1984) (reconfirming that a statistical showing
of discrimination below the EEOC’s four-fifths rule is sufficient to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination, which justifies the use of race-conscious remedies); Kirkland v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 711 F.2d 1117, 1128 (2d Cir. 1983) (“It is
settled that voluntary compliance is a preferred means of achieving Title VII’s goal of
eliminating employment discrimination.”).
116. Ricci v. DeStefano, 264 Fed. App’x 106, 107 (2d Cir. 2008), withdrawn and
superseded by, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
117. Id.
118. Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87, 87 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 2658
(2009).
119. Id.
120. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664–65 (2009).
121. Id. at 2664.
122. Id. at 2674–75.
123. Id. at 2674.
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Such an approach, according to the Court, would “bring compliance efforts to a near standstill.”124 The Court also rejected the City’s argument
that the appropriate standard is the employer’s good-faith belief that its
actions are required to comply with Title VII’s disparate impact.125 Such a
“minimal standard could cause employers to discard the results of lawful
and beneficial promotional examinations even where there is little if any
evidence of disparate-impact discrimination.”126
In striking a balance between the two proffered standards by the
firefighters and the City, the Court turned to equal protection jurisprudence and adopted the strong basis in evidence standard.127 Drawing from
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,128 the Court asserted that “government actions to remedy past racial discrimination—actions that are themselves
based on race—are constitutional only where there is a ‘strong basis in
evidence’ that the remedial actions were necessary.”129 The Court drew
upon Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education130 to determine the best way
of dealing with disharmonious provisions.131 Accordingly, when “related
constitutional duties are not always harmonious . . . reconciling them requires . . . employers to act with extraordinary care.”132 Applying this
new standard to Title VII disparate impact claims, according to Kennedy,
“gives effect to both the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions, allowing violations of one in the name of compliance with the other
only in certain, narrow circumstances.”133
The majority did not question an employer’s affirmative efforts to
ensure that all groups have a fair opportunity.134 Rather, the Court concluded that an employer may not invalidate test results that disturb an
“employee’s legitimate expectation not to be judged on the basis of
race.”135 To allow such disturbance, according to the Court, would be
equivalent to the same discrimination Title VII seeks to eradicate and

124. Id.
125. Id. at 2674–75.
126. Id. at 2675.
127. Id.
128. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
129. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2675 (quoting Richard v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
500 (1989)).
130. 476 U.S. 267 (1989).
131. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2675.
132. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
133. Id. at 2676.
134. Id. at 2677.
135. Id.
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would be antithetical to the belief that employees can enjoy equal opportunity in the workplace, irrespective of race.136
The Court then turned to the issue of whether the City had a strong
basis in evidence that warranted discarding the promotional tests.137 The
Court acknowledged that the firefighters did not dispute that the City was
faced with a prima facie case of disparate impact liability.138 However,
liability would only occur if the employer was unable to show that the
examinations were job related and consistent with business necessity, or if
there was another valid, but less discriminatory alternative available that
the City refused to adopt.139
According to the Court, the examinations were valid because the
tests were created “after painstaking analyses of the captain and lieutenant positions—analyses in which IOS made sure that minorities were
overrepresented.”140 The argument, that the examinations contained contradictory and irrelevant questions, was countered by the fact that IOS
entertained such challenges to the questions and provided feedback to
the City, as well as the fact that IOS threw out at least one question.141
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the City “turned a blind eye to evidence that supported the exams’ validity” and that the City had not obtained additional detailed information regarding the potential causes of
any disparities within the tests from IOS pertaining to such validity.142
D. Scalia’s Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia’s concurrence explained that he would have gone even
further than the majority. In his view, Title VII’s disparate impact provision requires employers to engage in discriminatory practices, because it
forces them to “evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and to
make decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes.”143 Scalia
seemed most skeptical of the disparate impact provision, as it relates to
the Equal Protection Clause, because the disparate impact provision appears to promote racial quotas within the workplace, thus suggesting that

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
256, 279

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2678.
Id.
Id. at 2679.
Id.
Id. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
(1979)).
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Scalia might be prepared to strike the discriminatory impact provision of
Title VII as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.144
E. Supreme Court’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent for the four-person minority began by
quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, saying that “in assessing claims of race discrimination, ‘[c]ontext matters.’”145 According to Ginsburg, the Ricci majority ruled with the presumption that the City disregarded the test results
because the higher scoring employees were white—a position that ignored “substantial evidence of multiple flaws” in the tests.146 Justice Ginsburg, citing to a U.S. Commission on Civil Rights report, acknowledged
that “racial discrimination in municipal employment [was] even ‘more
pervasive than in the private sector.’”147 It is in this context that race matters, as public employers often “rel[ied] on criteria unrelated to job performance” in their hiring and promotion decisions.148 This same report,
according to Ginsburg, “singled out police and fire departments for having ‘[b]arriers to equal employment . . . greater . . . than in any other
area of State or local government.’”149 Ginsburg then noted that “[i]t is
against this backdrop of entrenched inequality that the promotion process at issue in this [case] should be assessed.”150
Asserting that the tests were flawed from their conception, Ginsburg stated that the City “did not closely consider what sort of ‘practical’

144. Id. at 2682–83. Justice Alito, writing the second concurrence, added little to
the analysis of the legal issue, but merely stated his view that the City had merely
acted because of the pressure placed on it by Reverend Boise Kimber, an African
American minister, and other minorities in the community. See id. at 2687–88 (Alito,
J., concurring).
145. Id. at 2689–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 327 (2003)).
146. Id. at 2690.
147. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 15 (1972)).
148. Id. (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 1817 (1972)).
149. Id. at 2690–91 (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 1817 (1972)) (alterations in original). Ginsburg pointed to the fact that the City of New Haven was no exception to the
report’s findings, as only 3.6 percent of African Americans and Hispanics were employed by the fire department, despite these two groups comprising of 30 percent of
the City’s population. Id. at 2691. At that time, minority groups were even more underrepresented in the higher-ranked positions as there was only one African American officer out of the 107 officers in the department. Id. (citing Firebird Soc. of New
Haven, Inc. v. New Haven Bd. of Fire Comm’rs, 66 F.R.D. 457, 460 (Conn. 1975).
Ginsburg noted that the disparities in supervisory positions was still prevalent, as African Americans and Hispanics made up about 18 percent of such positions, with only
one African American fire captain out of the twenty-one captains overall. See id.
150. Id.
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examination ‘would fairly measure the relative fitness and capacity of the
applicants to discharge the duties’ of a fire officer.”151 Instead, the City
decided to continue the test procedure in its two-decades-old union contract, which consisted of a written examination (worth 60 percent) and an
oral examination (worth 40 percent).152 After the tests were administered,
the scores revealed major racial disparities, which gave the City “cause
for concern about the prospect of Title VII litigation and liability.”153 The
City’s decision may have been race conscious, but that did not mean that
the City engaged in racially disparate treatment.154
Ginsburg focused on the majority’s assumption that the disparate
impact and disparate treatment provisions of Title VII were in conflict
with one another. She reiterated that Griggs established that Title VII
“proscribe[d] not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair
in form, but discriminatory in operation.”155 As such, in order for the majority to reach its conclusion, it would have to ignore Griggs.156 After reviewing the Griggs, Albemarle, and Wards Cove cases, Ginsburg rejected
the majority’s assertion that there was a conflict between disparate treatment and disparate impact.157 She stated, “[n]either Congress’ enactments
nor this Court’s Title VII precedents (including the now-discredited decision in Wards Cove) offer even a hint of conflict between an employer’s
obligations under the statute’s disparate treatment and disparate-impact
provisions.”158 Ginsburg argued that the two prongs stand on equal footing as they “advance the same objectives: ending workplace discrimination and promoting genuinely equal opportunity.”159
Ginsburg argued that the majority opinion unnecessarily placed the
disparate impact and disparate treatment provisions at odds with one another, thereby ignoring the Court’s longstanding practice when faced with
alleged competing clauses, of interpreting “separate provisions of a single
Act [as giving] the Act the most harmonious, comprehensive meaning

151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2692.
154. Id. at 2696. According to Ginsburg, this was evidenced by the mere fact that
all tests’ scores were discarded, ensuring that every firefighter, irrespective of race,
was similarly circumstanced. Id.
155. Id. at 2696 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)
(alteration in original)).
156. Id. at 2696–97.
157. Id. at 2699.
158. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
159. Id.
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possible in light of the legislative policy and purpose.”160 Ginsburg argued
that if a voluntary affirmative action plan, which clearly used a protected
class as a factor, can survive a disparate treatment challenge, so should an
employer using a protected class as a factor in a reasonable effort to comply with Title VII’s disparate impact provision.161 As such, Ginsburg argued that an “employer must have good cause to believe the device
would not withstand examination for business necessity” prior to rejecting test scores.162 Ginsburg, criticizing the newly adopted “strong basis
in evidence” standard, argued it was one of limited use because the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits only intentional discrimination, thus Equal
Protection jurisprudence is of little help in evaluating its operation in disparate impact claims.163
IV. IMPLICATIONS IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS
In adopting the “strong basis in evidence” standard for evaluating
an employer’s rejection of test results on disparate impact grounds, the
Court never confronted the fact that the circuit courts have differed
greatly on how to apply it in the constitutional context. This section explores how those circuit court splits over the constitutional standard
might lead to similar splits over how that test ought apply in the Title VII
disparate impact context. Specifically, this section looks at how Ricci
might have been decided under the First, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits
based upon their Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.164

160. Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609,
631–32 (1973)). The dissent also stated that “[a] particular phrase need not ‘extend to
the outer limits of its definitional possibilities’ if an incongruity would result.” Id.
(quoting Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006)). See also id. at 2700
(The Court rejected a disparate treatment claim and held that under affirmative action, employers may consider gender as one of numerous factors, and such action is
consistent with Title VII because the plan sought to eradicate discrimination in the
workplace. (citing Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cnty., 480 U.S. 616
(1987))).
161. Id. at 2700.
162. Id. at 2699. According to Ginsburg, this was the normal and proper standard
for Title VII issues. See id.
163. Id. at 2700–2701.
164. The Second and Seventh Circuits appear to apply an approach similar to the
First Circuit. See, e.g., Jana-Rock Constr., Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Econ. Dev., 438
F.3d 195 (2nd Cir. 2006) (affirming an affirmative action program that excluded Spanish and Portuguese descendants from qualifying as Hispanic); McNamara v. City of
Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming the city’s affirmative action promotion plan for minority firefighters). The Fifth and Sixth Circuits apply an approach
similar to the Fourth Circuit. See, e.g., Dall. Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of Dallas, TX,
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A. Strong Basis in Evidence in the First Circuit
The First Circuit appears to exercise a somewhat liberal approach
when analyzing whether a party has met its strong basis in evidence burden in the constitutional context, as supported by its affirmative action
opinion, Stuart v. Roache, which concerned whether statistical disparities
alone could lead to an inference of discrimination.165 In Roache, white
police officers alleged equal protection violations due to the Boston Police Department’s affirmative action programs aimed at promoting minority police officers.166 The Roache court was faced with determining if
the Boston Police Department violated the Fourteenth Amendment
when it promoted minority police officers over white police officers with
higher scores.167
In determining whether there was a strong basis in evidence for remedial measures, the court first indicated that the statistical figures alone
could make out a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination.168 The court

150 F.3d 438 (5th Cir. 1998) (striking down the city’s out of rank affirmative action
promotion plan for minority firefighters); Middleton v. City of Flint, MI, 92 F.3d 396
(6th Cir. 1996) (striking down the city’s affirmative action promotion plan for minority firefighters ). The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits appear to apply an approach similar to the Tenth Circuit. See, e.g., Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of Transp., 345
F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming the city’s affirmative action program that gave
preference to minority contractors); Peightal v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 26 F.3d 1545 (11th
Cir. 1994) (affirming the city’s minority firefighter preference affirmative action program). The Third and Ninth Circuits appear to apply a hybrid approach including
some elements of the three main approaches reviewed in the chosen circuits. See, e.g.,
Contractors Ass’n of Eastern Pa., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 91 F.3d 586 (3rd Cir.
1996) (striking down the city’s ordinance that authorized a set-aside for African
American subcontractors); W. States Paving, Co., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Transp.,
407 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming the state’s compelling interest for implementing construction affirmative action program).
165. 951 F.2d 446, 451 (1st Cir. 1991).
166. Id. at 448–49.
167. See id. The issue arose because the Massachusetts Association of AfroAmerican Police, Inc. (MAAP) sued the Boston Police Department claiming that promotional testing procedures were biased against African American police officers. Id.
at 448. These procedures, they alleged, created an “all-white cadre of sergeants.” Id.
That case was settled, and the police department entered a Consent Decree “in which
(among other things) the [police department] promised to use only promotional tests
specifically validated as anti-discriminatory and fair.” Id.
168. Id. at 450. The court pointed to the fact that the Consent Decree indicated
that only one of 222 sergeants in the police department was black, even though seventy-two were eligible for promotions at the time. Id. The court stated, “[t]he relevant
percentages—0.45% black sergeants in a Department with 4.5% eligible black officers would seem to make out a prima facie case of discrimination under disparate
impact analysis as applied by many courts.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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also disposed of the white officers’ argument that City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co.169 stood for the proposition that even greater disparities
were insufficient to meet the strong basis in evidence standard.170 According to Roache, Croson did not dismiss the statistics because they were not
“strong” evidence of discrimination but because they were improperly
compiled.171 In relying on Justice O’Connor’s Wygant concurrence, the
First Circuit implicitly accepted that once a prima facie case of discrimination is made through statistics, the burden will shift to the non-minority
party to discredit the statistics, concluding that “[t]he very purpose of
‘disparate impact’ analysis is to use a numerical comparison that will help
identify a possibly unfair, discriminatory hurdle interposed between the
eligible minority applicant and success.”172 This could be understood as
using a Griggs liberal approach with disparate impact—even in the constitutional context.173
The First Circuit’s application of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence suggests that it might be supportive of minority firefighters if Ricci
were before the First Circuit on remand. First, the majority opinion in
Ricci recognized that there was a significant racial adverse impact that
169. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
170. Roache, 951 F.2d at 450.
171. Id. at 450–51. According to the court, the City of Richmond improperly
“compared minority participation in the construction industry with general population figures.” Id. at 450. This was important to the court because “where special qualifications are necessary, the relevant statistical pool for purposes of demonstrating
discriminatory exclusion must be the number of minorities qualified to undertake the
particular task.” Id. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 501–02). The court added to this
analysis and stated that “where special qualifications are relevant, a comparison to
general population figures will not tend to show past discrimination by the specific
governmental unit involved, for it may just as well reflect past societal discrimination
in education and economic opportunities.” Id. at 451 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
172. Id. (relying on Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 293 (1986)
(O’Connor, J., concurring)). The Roache court emphasized the white officers’ unsuccessful attempt at discrediting the statistics utilized by the police department to establish their prima facie case of discrimination. Id. The summation given by the court as
to why a strong basis in evidence existed for the remedial action was based upon the
statistical evidence. Id. at 452. Specifically, the four articulated reasons were:
(1) numbers that make out a “disparate impact;” (2) a past history of entrylevel discrimination; (3) allegations of unfair, discriminatory promotional examinations; and (4) no significant effort by the Department or the plaintiffs,
here or earlier, to rebut the natural inference of discrimination arising from
the first three of these circumstances.

Id.
173. Recall that Griggs does not require intent—only that some neutral policy or
practice stands as a barrier to an identified group of individuals. See supra notes 24–31
and accompanying text.

R
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was not disputed by the white firefighters.174 This significant adverse impact appears to satisfy the First Circuit’s “natural inference of discrimination arising” from a statistical disparity.175 Furthermore, using the overt
discriminatory actions taken by the City of New Haven against minorities
in the fire department, as documented by Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting
opinion, might support such a position.176 When a governmental entity
directly or passively engages in discriminatory actions, remedial measures
taken as a result may not be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Like the circumstances in Roache, the City of New Haven was engaged in
a previous litigation which found that “‘[o]f the 107 officers in the Department only one was black, and he held the lowest rank above private.’”177 This litigation, like the previous litigation in Roache, resulted in
a settlement agreement with the City of New Haven, where the City initiated remedial efforts to increase minority representation within the fire
department.178 Thus, this more liberal application of the “strong basis in
evidence” test in the equal protection context suggests that such Title VII
disputes involving governmental rejection of test results might lean more
in favor of the governmental entity.179
B. Strong Basis in Evidence in the Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit, unlike the First Circuit, uses a more stringent
approach when determining if a party has met its strong basis in evidence
requirement in the constitutional context. When race is an issue in the
case, the Fourth Circuit begins from the premise that “the use of race as a
reparational device risks perpetuating the very race-consciousness such a
remedy purposes to overcome. . . . [T]hus . . . race is an impermissible
arbiter of human fortunes.”180 That premise has materialized in Podber-

174. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2678 (2009) (recognizing that “[t]he
pass rates of minorities, which were approximately one-half the pass rates for white
candidates, fall well below the 80-percent standard set by the EEOC to implement the
disparate-impact provision of Title VII”).
175. See Roache, 951 F.2d at 452.
176. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2690–91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing how the
profession of firefighters had a history of discriminatory action towards minorities).
177. Id. at 2691 (quoting Firebird Soc’y of New Haven, Inc. v. New Haven Bd. of
Fire Comm’rs, 66 F.R.D. 457, 460 (D. Conn. 1975)).
178. Id.
179. See Roache, 951 F.2d at 452 (stating that “litigated court findings of recent
entry-level discrimination would seem sufficient to justify race-conscious remedies at
both entry and promotional levels”).
180. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 152 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Md. Troopers Ass’n, Inc. v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1076 (4th Cir. 1993)). This approach is at odds
with the district judge who thought it inappropriate to apply employment case doc-
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esky v. Kirwan, a case concerning the University of Maryland at College
Park’s merit scholarship program aimed specifically at African American
students.181 In support of its remedial scholarship program, the university
articulated four present effects of past discrimination, which were determined to form the strong evidentiary basis needed under the Fourteenth
Amendment.182
Under Fourth Circuit equal protection jurisprudence, it is, however,
insufficient to simply point to past discrimination; rather, the past discrimination must be proven to be the root of the present effect.183 This
higher burden is imposed by the Fourth Circuit in order to “determin[e]
what classifications are benign or remedial and what classifications are in
fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial
politics.”184 As proof of this connection, the university offered that racial
incidents occurred with regularity on the campus and were a direct result

trine in an educational context. Id. at 153. This disagreement appears to support the
proposition that deploying constitutional standards in the statutory context is difficult
and inappropriate at times. The Fourth Circuit quoted the district court judge as
saying:
I have reached the conclusion that in our earlier opinions both I and the
Fourth Circuit may have construed too rigid a framework of analysis,” and
this “[b]ecause I have come to believe that (1) precedents involving employment disputes provide imperfect analogies for determining the constitutionality of an affirmative action program in an education context, and (2) focusing
solely upon past discrimination in education cases blurs vision and obstructs
understanding . . .

Id. (alterations in original). See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 255 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that Title VII’s standards are not always consistent
with constitutional standards and should not be used interchangeably between the
two).
181. Kirwan, 38 F.3d at 152. There were two scholarship programs available, the
Banneker program made available only to African American students and the Francis
Scott Key program, which is not restricted to African American students. Id. A Hispanic student challenged the university’s dual scholarship program claiming an equal
protection violation due to the fact that he was ineligible for the Banneker scholarship. Id.
182. Id. The four articulated reasons were: “(1) The University has a poor reputation within the African-American community; (2) African-Americans are underrepresented in the student population; (3) African-American students who enroll at
the University have low retention and graduation rates; and (4) the atmosphere on
campus is perceived as being hostile to African-American students.” Id.
183. See id. at 153 (The Fourth Circuit remanded this case previously “to allow
the district court to determine whether the University could prove that there were
present effects of past discrimination which warranted such race conscious remedial
action.”)
184. Id. (quoting Evans, 993 F.2d at 1076) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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of the racial climate created by the past discrimination.185 This argument
was rejected as too tenuous.186 Specifically, there was no evidence that
implicated past discrimination on the part of the university as opposed to
current societal discrimination.187
Statistical evidence must point, with some precision, to the alleged
discriminatory action in order to be considered valuable in the Fourth
Circuit. The “effects [the statistics allege to show] must be examined to
see whether they were caused by the past discrimination.”188 The court
ruled that statistical evidence of high attrition and low retention rates for
African Americans was insignificant, because those rates could have been
caused by economic factors.189 Unlike the First Circuit, there is no inference of discrimination gleaned from statistics available to plaintiffs. The
court further reasoned that a student survey articulating racial tensions
on campus did not satisfy this burden because the university could not
rule out societal discrimination as a factor.190
The Fourth Circuit’s “strong basis in evidence analysis” is exactly
the sort of analysis Ricci brought to the statutory context of Title VII
disparate impact claims. The City of New Haven would be hard-pressed
to meet its burden with the evidence provided to the Supreme Court if it
was decided in the Fourth Circuit. In order to begin the discussions of
invalidating the test scores, the City of New Haven would need to point
to, with some precision, the exact discriminatory cause of the statistical
imbalance. This would be a daunting task for the City because the City
did not indicate any specific causes of the test discrepancies save for anecdotal evidence and testing experts.191 The expert’s testimony would add
185. See id. at 154.
186. See id. at 154–55.
187. Id. at 155.
188. Id. at 154.
189. See id. at 156.
190. See id. at 154–55. The court began its discussion of this matter by acknowledging that “any poor reputation the University may have in the African-American
community is tied solely to knowledge of the University’s discrimination before it
admitted African-American students.” Id. at 154. The court also acknowledged that
Maryland citizens were aware of this horrid history. Id. Nevertheless, “mere knowledge of [such] historical fact[s] is not the kind of present effect that can justify a raceexclusive remedy.” Id. The court discounted the student surveys by asserting “[t]he
frequency and regularity of the incidents, as well as claimed instances of backlash to
remedial measures, do not necessarily implicate past discrimination on the part of the
University, as opposed to present societal discrimination.” Id. The court, however, did
not point to the societal discrimination driving the opinions of these students
surveyed.
191. Dr. Hornick testified that an “assessment center process, which would have
evaluated candidates’ behavior in typical job tasks, would have demonstrated less ad-
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virtually no value to the City’s case if decided within the Fourth Circuit,
because it does not point, with sufficient precision, to the alleged cause of
discrimination. Instead, it provides information that is already known to
most individuals—people perform differently on tests.
C. Strong Basis in Evidence in the Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit employs a strong basis of evidence analysis that
invites the usage of statistics and anecdotal evidence, and that does not
require proving conclusively the past or present discrimination. In Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, the plaintiff
challenged Denver’s affirmative action ordinance that established certain
participating goals for racial minorities and women in construction and
professional design projects.192 Specifically, the plaintiff believed the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it had lost three contracts with Denver because it did not
adhere to the annual goals.193 In opposition to the plaintiff’s challenge,

verse impact.” Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2680 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). This was ultimately rejected as not raising a genuine issue of material
fact pertaining to the tests. See id. Janet Helms, a professor of counseling psychology
at Boston College, testified to how members from certain racial groups do their jobs
differently. Id. at 2694 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Specifically, she testified that “often
because the experiences that are open to white male firefighters are not open to members of these other under-represented groups.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court appeared to discount her offering to the case by noting, for example,
that her “primary area of expertise is not with firefighters per se but in race and
cultures as they influence performance on tests and other assessment procedures.” Id.
at 2669 (internal quotation marks omitted).
192. 321 F.3d 950, 954 (10th Cir. 2003). There were:
annual goals for the utilization of minority business enterprises (“MBEs”)
and women business enterprises (“WBEs”). Of the total dollars spent annually for construction contracts with the City, the goal was 16% to MBEs and
12% to WBEs. The annual goals for professional design and construction services were 10% of annual expenditures to MBEs and 10% to WBEs.

Id. at 956. An MBE was considered a business that was 51 percent owned by one or
more minorities, which included Blacks, Hispanics, Asian Americans, and American
Indians. Id. A WBE was a considered a business that was 51 percent owned by women where one or more women controlled daily business operations. Id.
193. Id. at 957. The plaintiff in support of its position relied on Croson. Id.
(“ ‘[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to smoke out illegitimate uses of race . . . [and]
ensure[ ] that the means chosen fit [the] compelling goal so closely that there is little
or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice
or stereotype.’ ” (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493
(1989) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in
original)).
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Denver asserted that it had a compelling governmental interest in “remedying racial discrimination within its jurisdiction.”194
Remedying racial discrimination appears, in the Tenth Circuit, to be
a more important factor in favor of the governmental entity. Denver
needed only to show that it had a strong basis in evidence for enacting its
remedial measures and was not required to “conclusively prov[e] the existence of past or present racial discrimination.”195 In meeting this burden,
Denver could rely on “empirical evidence that demonstrates ‘a significant
statistical disparity’” and could “supplement the statistical evidence with
anecdotal evidence of public and private discrimination.”196
Denver, like many other jurisdictions, had processes in place by way
of “rules, guidelines, and biases [that] operated to effectively bar [minorities] from participating in City contracting.”197 Denver produced evidence
that it was not until 1977, when they received a Department of Housing
and Urban Development report; they were made aware that their
processes were not in compliance with affirmative action requirements.198
Denver produced extensive statistical evidence that included multiple disparity studies conducted since 1989.199 In addition, Denver produced anecdotal evidence that indicated the discriminatory methods used by the

194. Id. at 958. The Tenth Circuit recognized that a “clear majority of the Supreme Court has expressly held that ‘[a] State’s interest in remedying the effects of
past or present racial discrimination may in the proper case justify a government’s use
of racial distinctions.’ ” Id. (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909 (1996)) (alteration in original).
195. Id. Relying on its previous decision in the case, the court indicated that anecdotes complement statistics of discrimination. Id. (quoting Concrete Works of Colo.,
Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver (Concrete Works II), 36 F.3d 1513, 1520 (10th Cir.
1994) (“Personal accounts of actual discrimination or the effects of discriminatory
practices may, however, vividly complement empirical evidence.”)).
196. Id. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 509 (plurality opinion)).
197. Id. at 960.
198. Id. at 960–61.The Department of Housing and Urban Development conducted an investigation pursuant to a grievance filed by the Minority Association of
Contractors. Id. The investigative report concluded:
The [C]ity failed to take those reasonable actions to overcome the effects of
conditions which resulted in limited participation in the benefits of the [Community Development Block Grant] Program, and failed to make reasonable
efforts to meet the special needs of the minority contractors which in effect
resulted in minority contractors not taking full advantage of the [Community
Development Block Grant] Program.

Id. at 960. The court also provided the historical context of how the ordinances came
into existence, including the discrimination that motivated the ordinances and the remedial measures taken by Denver. Id. at 961–62.
199. Id. at 962–69.
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government.200 The Tenth Circuit went even further, noting that “it is immaterial for constitutional purposes whether the industry discrimination
springs from widespread discriminatory attitudes shared by society or is
the product of policies, practices, and attitudes unique to the industry,”
because Denver provided evidence that the discrimination was present in
the construction industry regardless of its genesis in society.201
The Tenth Circuit allows an inference to be drawn from evidence
produced that there was past or present discrimination.202 In fact, according to the Tenth Circuit, “the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a
court to make an ultimate finding of discrimination before a municipality
may take affirmative steps to eradicate discrimination.”203 In fact, it determined that “[s]trong evidence is that ‘approaching a prima facie case of a
constitutional or statutory violation,’ not irrefutable or definitive proof of
discrimination.”204 The Tenth Circuit definitively stated that the strong basis in evidence burden could be met “through the introduction of statistical and anecdotal evidence alone.”205
Armed with promotional tests showing significant statistical disparities between white and minority firefighters and anecdotal evidence attesting to discrimination, the City of New Haven’s noncertification of the
tests might well be justified. First, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
there was a prima facie case of disparate impact.206 Under the Tenth Circuit’s strong basis in evidence approach, the Ricci evidence might be suf-

200. Id. at 969–70. Such evidence included, among other things, that minority and
women contractors reported that they were subjected to different treatment when on
job sites. Id. at 969. Some encountered graffiti with racial epithets at job sites. Id.
Some minorities and women were not hired because the majority-owned firms felt
that they lacked the proper competence to handle the jobs. Id. There was testimony
that women and minorities were harassed by way of being called “bitches,” “nigger,”
and “dumb nigger.” Id.
201. Id. at 972. But see Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver,
540 U.S. 1027, 1030 (2003) (mem.), denying cert. to Concrete Works of Colo., Inc., v.
City & Cnty. of Denver, 321 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (According to Scalia, who believes the Tenth Circuit misinterprets Croson, because “[i]t is
inconsistent with Croson to permit racial preferences as a remedy for mere ‘mighthave-been’ racial discrimination, established by nothing more than evidence ‘from
which an inference of past of present discrimination could be drawn.’ ”).
202. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 970 (discussing the lower court’s criticism of the
evidence produced by Denver).
203. Id. at 971 (quoting Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver
(Concrete Works II), 36 F.3d 1513, 1522 (10th Cir. 1994)).
204. Id. at 971 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500
(1989)) (first emphasis added).
205. Id. at 972 (emphasis added).
206. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677 (2009).
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ficient to meet the City’s burden. This is particularly important given that
Title VII has codified Grigg’s disparate impact, and both disparate treatment and disparate impact are cognizable claims under Title VII.207 Second, the City of New Haven adduced statistical evidence that showed the
promotional tests disproportionately eliminated promotion opportunities
for minority groups.208 Third, there is evidence that study materials were
unavailable to minorities.209 Fourth, the City of New Haven’s poor history
of hiring minorities was attributed to their inability to turn to other
firefighters or their families and communities to obtain assistance.210 In
total, the evidence proffered by the City of New Haven allows for a
strong inference of past or present discrimination under the Tenth Circuit’s standard.
In summary, it appears the Ricci majority opinion employed the
more rigid Fourth Circuit “strong basis in evidence analysis” in the statutory context. While the circuits are split in their equal protection jurisprudence, this does not necessarily denote that they would not employ
approaches similar to the Fourth Circuit. In fact, it appears that Ricci
prohibits employers from rejecting test scores that disproportionately affect an identified group of individuals211—even when such test fails to
properly measure skills.212 Ricci could also be interpreted as protecting
nonminority plaintiffs’ legitimate employment expectations of upper mobility based upon merit alone—not race.213 Without clarification from the

207. See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text.
208. Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 154 (D. Conn. 2006).
209. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2692–93.
210. Id. at 2693.
211. See supra notes 120–121 and accompanying text.
212. See Lynda L. Arakawa & Michele Park Sonen, Note, Caught in the Backdraft: The Implications of Ricci v. DeStefano on Voluntary Compliance and Title VII,
32 U. Haw. L. Rev. 463, 476 (2010) (arguing that merit-based selection processes do
not properly measure the skills sought, but instead embrace social biases).
213. See Girardeau A. Spann, Postracial Discrimination, MOD. AM., Fall 2009, at
26, 35 (arguing that the majority opinion in Ricci “re-struck the balance between
white and minority interests in Title VII cases” as it did in affirmative action cases).
See also Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73 (2010). Harris and West-Faulcon describe Ricci as a way of turning racial discrimination into “white injury:”
A close reading of Ricci reveals how not all claims of race discrimination are
evaluated on a level playing field. Although the holding in Ricci is not unambiguous (and in some respects the unusual factual predicate may ultimately
limit its reach), Ricci reflects a doctrinal move towards converting efforts to
rectify racial inequality into white racial injury. Ricci facilitates this racial project in two distinct but interrelated ways: (1) by whitening discrimination—
that is reframing antidiscrimination law’s presumptions and burdens to focus
on disparate treatment of whites as the paradigmatic and ultimately preferred

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\41-1\NMX105.txt

326

unknown

Seq: 32

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

16-NOV-11

11:10

[Vol. 41

Supreme Court, it is uncertain as to the exact impact of Ricci, but what is
certain is that circuits may interpret Ricci as requiring them to employ the
Fourth Circuit’s approach.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ricci decision punishes those governmental employers who
seek to ensure their policies and procedures are not disproportionately
inhibiting an identifiable group. Ricci does not expressly overrule Griggs,
but it is at odds with Grigg’s essential holding, that Title VII is aimed at
limiting both, intentional and unintentional discriminatory consequences
of employers’ actions, not simply an employers’ motivations. Without a
more comprehensive or flexible framework for applying the strong basis
in evidence standard in a statutory context, many employers will be
forced to either violate the disparate impact provision of Title VII by
ignoring the adverse impacts of hiring practices on race, or they will continue current discriminatory policies and practices because the Ricci standard is so difficult to comprehend.
Justice Scalia emphatically denounced the Tenth Circuit’s analysis as
a “watered-down ‘you don’t need to prove discrimination’ standard.”214
Yet, the Supreme Court provided an unclear heightened standard in the
statutory Title VII context when it decided Ricci. With such a varying
approach in the circuits and the strong basis in evidence standard in the
constitutional context, attorneys and their clients may continue to wrestle
with Ricci’s impact. However, given the Roberts Court’s history of undermining the force of remedial legislation, such as Title VII, Congress will
likely need to once again step in and amend Title VII to expressly reject
the reasoning of Ricci.

claim; and (2) by racing efforts to install fair selection measures—that is,
treating the use of job-related assessment tools that correct racial imbalance
and better measure merit as racially disparate treatment of whites.

Id. at 81.
214. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 540 U.S. 1027, 1030
(2003) (mem.), denying cert. to Concrete Works of Colo., Inc., v. City & Cnty. of
Denver, 321 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

